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CIVIL RICO ACTIONS IN COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION: RACKETEER OR
BUSINESSMAN?
by Drew Alan Campbell
N 1970 Congress responded to the proliferation of organized crime in
the United States by enacting the Organized Crime Control Act.I Sec-
tion 901(a) of the Act, commonly known as the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),2 is designed to combat the infil-
tration of organized crime and racketeering 3 into legitimate businesses.4
To accomplish this objective, Congress, while providing criminal sanctions
under section 1963 of RICO 5 also affords government prosecutors the ad-
vantages of a civil action under section 1964.6 Of greater significance to
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28
U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as OCCA-70].
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3. Racketeering is commonly defined as the "[a]ctivities of organized criminals who
extort money from legitimate businesses by violence or other forms of threats or intimida-
tion or conduct of illegal enterprise .. " BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 1132 (5th ed. 1979).
Although RICO specifies types of conduct that constitute racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), it does not define the term.
4. Statement of Findings and Purpose, OCCA-70, supra note 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1073:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering pro-
cess, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanc-
tions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
6. Id. § 1964:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to pre-
vent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropri-
ate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself
of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable re-
strictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but
not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of en-
deavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or
foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise,
making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In
any action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall
proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof.
Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such re-
straining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the ac-
ceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
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the private bar and its corporate clients, section 1964 expressly provides a
private right of action for any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a RICO violation.7 Under RICO's civil sanctions violators may
be subject to divestiture of any interest in a business enterprise, and busi-
nesses owned by or controlled by violators may be subject to enjoinment
from further business activities, dissolution, or reorganization. 8 RICO also
authorizes the award of treble damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's
fees in a successful private action.9 Because the proscribed activity under
RICO includes mail and wire fraud and violations of the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws,' 0 the statute provides an expansive
cause of action for the private plaintiff.
Only recently, however, have private parties begun to consider the broad
ramifications of RICO and to utilize the treble damage remedy in business
activities unrelated to organized crime." Because of RICO's limited use
by the private bar in the past, the courts, while strictly construing the stat-
ute, have only begun to consider its availability to individuals involved in
commercial disputes. 12 Thus far, some courts have imposed judicially cre-
ated restrictions on RICO's application in civil actions. Despite these early
signs, many civil litigants view the treble damages remedy and the poten-
tial settlement value of a racketeering allegation as creating a powerful and
versatile weapon for defrauded businessmen engaged in commercial
litigation.
This Comment provides an overview of the legislative history and con-
gressional purpose behind RICO. Additionally, this Comment analyzes
the statutory construction of RICO, examining the elements that constitute
a civil RICO violation and the types of proscribed conduct of particular
relevance to business lawyers and their clients. Included in this discussion
is the potential application of the Act to mail and wire fraud and to fraud
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in
any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall
estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal of-
fense in any subsequent civil proceedings brought by the United States.
7. Id § 1964(c).
8. Id § 1964(a).
9. Id § 1964(c).
10. Id § 1961(l)(B).
11. Although the public accusation of engaging in racketeering may imply an affiliation
with organized crime, liability under RICO is not necessarily predicated on such a finding.
See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1979); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1976); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 646 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Vignola,
464 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Pa.), af'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072
(1979). But see infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
During the first seven years of RICO's existence only two reported cases involved the
treble damage remedy of § 1964(c). See Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp.
1278 (D. Del. 1978); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Only in the
last five years have private parties begun to allege civil RICO violations.
12. See infra notes 121-42, 156-208 and accompanying text.
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under the securities laws. Recent decisions construing the requisites for
alleging a civil RICO action are considered, and this Comment analyzes
recent judicially imposed restrictions on the statute's availability in com-
mercial litigation. Finally, the future of RICO in commercial litigation is
contemplated in light of the legislative changes necessary to effectuate the
Act's intent and to alleviate the concern for vexatious racketeering
allegations.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE
BEHIND CIVIL RICO
In 1967 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice, well aware of organized crime's influence on legitimate
businesses and unions,13 reported on the prevailing methods employed by
organized crime to acquire control of business enterprises. 14 The Commis-
sion suggested that existing regulatory devices such as forfeiture, divesti-
ture, and dissolution be used to weaken the economic power base of
organized crime. 15 The Commission noted that use of these remedies
would avoid the troublesome procedural aspects of a criminal prosecution
by providing a lesser civil standard of proof, the availability of discovery,
the right to amend pleadings, and the right to appeal adverse decisions. 16
In response to the Commission's recommendations, Senate Bills 2048
and 2049 were proposed in an attempt to apply antitrust-type remedies to
organized criminal activity. 17 These bills were not acted upon by Con-
13. The Kefauver Committee reported in 1951:
One of the most perplexing problems in the field of organized crime is
presented by the fact that criminals and racketeers are using the profits of
organized crime to buy up and operate legitimate business enterpnses ...
In most cases, these are enterprises in which gangster methods have been used
to obtain monopolies so that their vicious practices taint otherwise legitimate
business ....
S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 33 (1951).
14. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189-90 (1967). The Commission
found: "Control of business concerns has usually been acquired through one of four meth-
ods: (1) investing concealed profits acquired from gambling and other illegal activities;
(2) accepting business interests in payment of the owner's gambling debts; (3) foreclosing on
usurious loans; and (4) using various forms of extortion." Id at 190.
15. Id. at 208. Professor G. Robert Blakey, a draftsman of RICO, credits the Commis-
sion's recommendation as the origin of the statute's civil-criminal dichotomy. See Blakey &
Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO).- Basic Concepts-Crimi-
nal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1015 n.25 (1980).
16. The advantages of civil remedies for a RICO violation were articulated by Senator
John L. McClellan, a co-sponsor of the bill that was incorporated into title IX of OCCA-70,
supra note 1. Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Relating to the Control of Organized
Crime in the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on S. 30].
17. In 1967, Senate Bill 2048 proposed an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act
prohibiting the investment or business use of unreported income. S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967). The bill's sponsor, Senator Roman L. Hruska, wanted the "extraordinarily
broad and flexible remedies" of the Sherman Act to have an impact upon the "legitimate"
business activities of organized crime. 113 CONG. REC. 17,999 (1967).
Senate Bill 2049 was independent legislation drafted to supplement the Sherman Act
19821
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gress, but the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, after
evaluating their potential effect, suggested that legislation should be
drafted as criminal statutes and should be independent of federal antitrust
laws. 18 As a result, in 1969 Senator John L. McClellan introduced Senate
Bill 30,19 a broad-based reform bill lacking any RICO-type provisions,
that was subsequently enlarged by Senator Roman L. Hruska's Senate Bill
1623.20 The combined effort gave rise to RICO's predecessor, Senate Bill
1861,21 which defined the scope of proscribed "racketeering activities ' '22
and required the illegal conduct to be performed through a "pattern of
racketeering. ' 23 After referral to the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of
the Senate Judiciary Committee and scrutiny by various segments of the
legal community,24 a revised version of Senate Bill 30 emerged and was
amendments proposed by Senate Bill 2048. S. 2049, 90th Cong., ist Sess. (1967). The bill
would prohibit: (1) the acquisition of an interest in a business affecting interstate commerce
with income derived from listed criminal activities, id. § 2(1); and (2) authorization by the
agent of a corporation to engage in any of the listed criminal activities, id § 3. The govern-
ment and third parties could seek enjoinment of S. 2049 violations, id § 4(b)-(c); treble
damages were available to victims, id § 5(a); and a full range of liberal procedural provi-
sions were provided, id §§ 5-10.
18. The Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association recommended the bills be
independent criminal statutes to avoid potential discord from the commingling of distinct
statutory purposes. See House Hearings on S. 30, supra note 16, at 149. The Antitrust Sec-
tion also recognized that a separate statute would free a private litigant from the restrictive
body of case precedent in antitrust law. Id
19. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 769 (1969).
20. The Criminal Activities Profits Act of 1969, S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG.
REC. 6995-96 (1969).
21. The Corrupt Organization Act of 1969, S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG.
REC. 9568-71 (1969).
22. (1) The term "racketeering activity" means (A) any act involving the dan-
ger of violence to life, limb or property, indictable under State or Federal law
and, punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is
indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States
Code: section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery),
sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), section 659 (relating to theft
from interstate shipment), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit
transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling transfor-
mation [sic]), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (re-
lating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1951 (relating to
interference with commerce, robbery or extortion), section 1952 (relating to
racketeering), section 1954 (relating to welfare fund bribery), sections 2314
and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections
2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), section 501(c) of the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (relating to embezzlement from
union funds), and (C) any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), 115 CONG. REC. 9569 (1969) (proposed § 1961(1)).
23. Senate Bill 1861 gave an unenlightening definition of a pattern: "(6) The term 'pat-
tern of racketeering activity' includes at least one act occurring after the effective date of this
Chapter." Id (proposed § 1961(6)).
24. The most vocal opposition to the proposed legislation came from the American
Civil Liberties Union. Hearings on S, 30 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dure ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 268 (1969). The ACLU was
concerned not only with possible fifth amendment and right to privacy violations, but more
importantly the Union feared that the broad legislation would extend beyond its intended
scope:
First and foremost we are concerned by the enormous and virtually unlimited
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passed almost unanimously by the Senate.25 The House of Representa-
tives, after adding a treble damages action 26 and narrowing certain statu-
tory definitions in Senate Bill '30,27 returned it to the Senate for final
approval. The basic form and substance of the bill remained unchanged,
and rather than risk the possible demise of the bill, the Senate concurred
with the House version.28 RICO was signed into law on October 15,
1970.29
The draftsmen of RICO intended a liberal construction and broad ap-
plication in order to effectuate the statute's purpose. 30 Although the legis-
lative history provides little insight into RICO's application to private
actions, it does emphasize the necessity for civil remedies to surmount the
inherent difficulties of criminal prosecution of organized crime figures. To
utilize those remedies fully, Congress expressly created a private right of
action for individuals victimized by conduct proscribed under RICO. 31
Because many of the offenses engaged in by organized crime, such as com-
mercial bribery and fraud, have also plagued corporate enterprises in the
past,32 RICO's application may not be limited, as originally contemplated,
breadth of the criminal provisions of the proposed legislation. . . .There is
no guarantee nor reason to assume that in times of stress, or where the aim
seems laudable, S. 1861 would not be used in areas far from what we know as
organized crime.
Id at 475. This concern with infringement upon the civil liberties of persons far removed
from organized crime should receive heightened attention with the emergence of private
party RICO litigation.
25. The Senate vote was 73 to 1. 116 CONG. REC. 972 (1970).
26. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,227 (remarks of Rep. Steiger).
27. The statutory definition of "unlawful debt" was changed to exclude legal gambling
debts from RICO's prohibition against collection of debts. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976). A
"pattern of racketeering activity" was limited by requiring two acts within a ten-year period.
d § 1961(5).
28. 116 CONG. REC. 36,296 (1970). Surprisingly, little House debate ensued over RICO,
and only three Congressmen feared the broad implications of RICO's creation of a private
cause of action. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4083. Congressmen Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan displayed considerable
sagacity in their concern over the private cause of action:
Indeed, another section of this title-section 1964(c)-provides invitation
for disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass innocent businessmen en-
gaged in interstate commerce by authorizing private damage suits. A competi-
tor need only raise the claim that his rival has derived gains from two games
of poker, and, because this title prohibits even the "indirect use" of such
gains-a provision with tremendous outreach-litigation is begun, What a
protracted, expensive trial may not succeed in doing, the adverse publicity
may well accomplish--destruction of the rival's business.
Id To avoid such a distortion of the legislation's intent, Congressman Mikva proposed an
amendment that would allow recovery of treble damages by the victim of a frivolous private
action under RICO. The amendment, however, was soundly defeated. 116 CONG. REC.
35,342, 35,343 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Mikva).
29. 116 CONG. REC. 37,264 (1970).
30. "The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes." Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970). See generally Note, RICO and the
Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980). But see United States v. The-
vis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (contrasting a liberal and strict construction of various
sections of RICO).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976); see supra note 6.
32. See Ross, How Lawless are Big Companies?, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 56, 58. The
1982]
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solely to syndicate corporate criminals. Arguably, any person twice vic-
timized by an enterprise may be able to assert a RICO violation despite the
fact that the alleged transgressor has no ties with organized crime. Thus,
as long as plaintiff in a business dispute can prove up the elements of a
RICO offense, the legislative history does not expressly preclude an osten-
sibly legitimate enterprise from being held accountable for racketeering
activity.
II. BECOMING A RACKETEER: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF RICO
RICO makes unlawfu 3 3 four types of activities by any person.34 First,
section 1962(a) forbids the use or investment of income derived from a
"pattern of racketeering activity" to operate or acquire an interest in any
enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 35 In essence, this sub-
section prevents "racketeers" from diversifying their interests by taking the
proceeds accumulated through illegal "racketeering activity" and investing
the income to acquire an enterprise. Secondly, subsection (b) prohibits the
acquisition or maintenance, through a "pattern of racketeering activity," of
any enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 36 Thirdly, subsec-
article features a "Roster of Wrongdoing" that focuses on cororate crime and lists major
corporations and their respective offenses. Principal among the improprieties were fraud
and bribery ("sensitive payments"), both of which are predicate offenses under RICO. Id
33. Professor Blakey emphasizes that although RICO's initial directive was at organized
crime,
RICO is not a criminal statute; it does not make criminal conduct that before
its enactment was not already prohibited, since its application depends on the
existence of "racketeering activity" that violates an independent criminal stat-
ute. In addition, its standards of unlawful, i e., criminal or civil, conduct are
sanctioned by both criminal and civil remedies. RICO, in short, is a "reme-
dial" statute.
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1021 n.71 (citations omitted).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976) defines "person" to include "any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." Id
35. Id. § 1962(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a prin-
cipal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for pur-
poses of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating
in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlaw-
ful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser,
the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any
pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such
purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding
securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the
power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
See United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980), the only reported decision to
date that premises its RICO allegation on § 1962(a). For an analysis of § 1962(a), see Note,
Investing Dirty Money." Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime ControlAct of 1970, 83 YALE
L.J. 1491 (1974).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a
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tion (c) prohibits any employee or associate of any enterprise affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce from conducting the affairs of such enterprise
through a "pattern of racketeering activity. '37 Finally, subsection (d) pro-
hibits any person from conspiring to violate any of the aforementioned
provisions. 38 An examination of the definition of a pattern of racketeering
activity and of the "enterprise" concept reveals how a legitimate business's
handling of its affairs, despite the lack of any connection with organized
crime, may bring it within the broad scope of RICO.
A. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Any acquisition or operation of an enterprise that violates RICO must
be accomplished through a pattern of racketeering activity. Racketeering
activity is defined prescriptively in section 1961, 3 9 and includes offenses
indictable under state law such as murder, gambling, and extortion. 40
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or main-
tain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
37. Id. § 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
38. Id. § 1962(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate
any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
39. Id. § 1961(1) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
As used in this chapter-
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under
any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201
(relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472,
and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from inter-
state shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664
(relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894
(relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the trans-
mission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), sec-
tion 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), sec-
tion 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), sec-
tion 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful
welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transporta-
tion of stolen property) . . . sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic),
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186
(dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501 (c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense
involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of secur-
ities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buy-
ing, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
punishable under any law of the United States.
40. Id. § 1961(1)(A).
1982]
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Bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud, acts indictable under federal law, are
also proscribed.4' More significantly in the corporate context, any offense,
indictable or not, involving fraud in the sale of securities constitutes racke-
teering activity under section 1961.42 A pattern of racketeering activity,
defined in section 1961(5), requires at least two acts of racketeering activity
within ten years of each other, one of which occurred after RICO's effec-
tive date.43 Although the legislative history of RICO suggests that the
racketeering acts must be related,an some judicial debate has arisen regard-
ing the necessity of a common link between the acts. 45 Some courts have
construed a pattern to require two acts occurring within ten years that are
connected by a common scheme, plan, or motive.46 Clearly, sporadic ac-
tivity will not suffice, 47 but some courts have held that the relationship to
an enterprise supplies a unifying link sufficient to constitute a pattern.48
Providing the unlawful acts are done in the conduct of the affairs of an
41. Id § 1961(1)(B).
42. Id. § 1961(i)(D).
43. Id. § 1961(5) (1976) provides: " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chap-
ter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
44. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595
(7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ad on other
grounds, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
46. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a//'don other grounds,
527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). The court construed the term
"pattern" as "requiring more than accidental or unrelated instances of proscribed behavior."
409 F. Supp. at 613. The court found support for this reading in a simultaneously enacted
section of the OCCA-70, supra note 1, § 3575(e)(3), which defined a "pattern of criminal
conduct" as follows: "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission,
or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."
See 409 F. Supp. at 614; see also United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883 (E.D. Wis.
1974).
47. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1970), states that the "factor of continuity
plus relationship . . . combines to produce a pattern."
48. See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978). The court in Weisman stated:
[T]he broad spectrum of predicate acts of racketeering enumerated in section
1961(1) belies any intent on the part of Congress to require that such predicate
acts of racketeering must possess a unitary character. . . . Most importantly,
the predicate acts constituting a "pattern of racketeering activity" must all be
done in the conduct of the affairs of an "enterprise." ... Thus, the enterprise
itself supplies a significant unifying link between the various predicate acts
624 F.2d at 1122 (citation omitted). Similarly, the Elliot court stated:
We note that at least two district courts have construed "a pattern of racke-
teering activity," as used in the Act, to require that the two or more acts of
"racketeering activity" be interrelated. United States v. White, 386 F. Supp.
882, 883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). On its face, however, the statute does not require such "in-
terrelatedness," and we can perceive no reason for reading it into the statutory
definition.
571 F.2d at 899 n.23. According to Professor Blakey, Elliot, not Stofsky, accurately defined
pattern. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1030 n.96.
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enterprise, a pattern arguably exists despite the lack of any interrelated-
ness. This broad interpretation of the definition of pattern may give signif-
icant latitude to the civil litigant who attempts to establish a pattern of
racketeering activity in framing a RICO allegation.
B. The Existence of an Enterprise
To violate RICO a person must acquire or maintain an interest in or
control an enterprise, 49 or conduct or participate in the enterprise's af-
fairs.50 Congress has provided the commercial litigant with a broad and
flexible concept in which to satisfy the enterprise element. The statutory
definition of enterprise includes "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity."'5 Courts have interpreted
this definition to include private businesses,5 2 government employees and
agencies,53 and labor organizations.54 Additionally, associations in fact,
informally organized groups of individuals, constitute a RICO enter-
prise.55 The Supreme Court recently decided that enterprise includes both
illegitimate and legitimate organizations. 56 Virtually any commercial en-
49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(b) (1976); see supra notes 35-36 for full text of §§ 1962(a) and
(b).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976); see supra note 37 for full text of § 1962(c).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (restaurant),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir.
1978) (beauty college); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(theater).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308, 313 (8th Cir. 1980) (county judge);
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage
Taxes), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.
1977) (law enforcement department), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afi'd, 578 F.2d
1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247, modied, 582 F.2d 104, 106 (2d
Cir. 1976).
56. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), in which the Supreme Court
refused to narrow the definition of enterprise by excluding illegitimate businesses from its
purview. Justice White, speaking for the majority, found the statute unambiguous:
On its face, the definition appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises within its scope . . . . Had Congress not intended to reach crimi-
nal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by
inserting a single word, "legitimate." But it did nothing to indicate that an
enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the
purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal.
Id at 580-81.
Some courts have balked in applying RICO to a legitimate business. In Barr v.
WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court held that Congress did not intend
to include legitimate businesses in their definition of enterprise:
The legislative history [of RICO] makes frequent references to "racketeers,"
"organized crime" and organized crime families, as well as the "syndicate,"
"Mafia" and "Cosa Nostra." It is clear that it was aimed not at legitimate
business organizations but at combating "a society of criminals who seek to
operate outside the control of the American people and their governments."
Id. at 113 (citations omitted); see infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text. Draftsman
Blakey disagreed with the court's reading of the statute: "There is nothing in RICO that
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tity, or subsidiary or division thereof, is an enterprise affecting interstate or
foreign commerce thus satisfying the statutory definition.
A literal reading of the Act suggests that a cause of action for treble
damages under section 1964(c) arises from injury caused by an enterprise's
involvement in racketeering activity, rather than from injury arising from
the activity itself.57 Hence, while section 1962 proscribes enterprise in-
volvement in racketeering activity, racketeering itself is not violative of the
section. 58 The courts, however, have construed the enterprise concept in
two distinct ways. The first approach, a broad construction of section
1964(c), contemplates that treble damage suits may be instituted whenever
a plaintiff alleges a section 1962 violation.5 9 If a pattern of racketeering
activity is used to invest in, control, or conduct the affairs of an interstate
enterprise, then damages may be sought despite the lack of any connection
between the alleged injuries and the section 1962 violation. Accordingly,
RICO applies as long as the injuries arise from a predicate offense that
comprises a part of the ultimate violation. This broad reading of the stat-
ute focuses upon injuries resulting directly from the predicate offenses
rather than upon injuries sustained as a result of a substantive violation of
RICO by the enterprise. In essence, this interpretation reads the enterprise
element out of the statute.60
A more restrictive statutory construction focuses upon injuries arising
from a defendant's conducting of an enterprise through a pattern of of-
fenses. 61 Under this reading recovery can be sought only when a plaintiff
is competitively injured by an interstate enterprise's involvement in or sub-
sidization by racketeering activities.62 RICO provides no recourse for an
injury arising solely from racketeering acts. This narrower reading of the
enterprise element reflects a recent attempt by some district courts to limit
private rights of action under section 1964(c). 63 Nonetheless, once the
existence of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce and a pattern of
says that, if legitimate businessmen act like racketeers, they should not be treated like racke-
teers." Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1025 n.91.
For a thorough analysis of the enterprise concept, see Note, The Enterprise Element in
RICO. A Proposed Interpretation, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123 (1980).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
58. Id § 1962(a)-(c).
59. See Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 646 (N.D. I11. 1980);
Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1279 (D. Del. 1978). Both cases
survived motions to dismiss although the suits alleged injury from securities fraud and failed
to allege damages arising from any enterprise involvement in the fraudulent activity. See
also United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 265-66, vacated en bane, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.
1980); United States v. Campanele, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1976).
60. See generally Comment, Reading the Enterprise Element Back Into RICO: Sections
1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 100 (1981).
61. See Maryville Academy v. Lock Rhoades & Co., 530 F. Supp. 1061, 1069-70 (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (RICO claim of securities fraud dismissed for failure to show damage arising from
putative racketeering activity); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, No. 80c 2644, slip
op. at 7-8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 1980) (fraud claim under RICO dismissed because of plaintiffs
failure to allege competitive injury).




racketeering activity have been shown, a RICO violation can be proved by
establishing a sufficient nexus between the activity and the enterprise.
RICO's liberal procedural rules facilitate the institution of a civil action
once a plaintiff demonstrates this connection.
C. Procedural Aspects of RICO 64
A RICO plaintiff may include the Attorney General and "any person
injured in his business or property. '65 In a civil action the federal district
courts have the authority to grant equitable relief including divestiture of
an interest in an enterprise, restrictions on future activities or investments,
and dissolution or reorganization of an enterprise. 66 A private party may
obtain treble damages and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.
67
The courts have yet to resolve, however, whether a private litigant may
obtain equitable relief under section 1964(c). If the courts interpret RICO
as granting a private right to obtain injunctive relief, which one court has
already done, 68 the Act's potential scope becomes even more expansive.
For example, RICO could conceivably become an effective antitakeover
device. A targeted company, threatened by a tender offer, could seek en-
joinment of the acquiring corporation's efforts if it could successfully al-
lege that the offering involved two predicate acts of securities, mail, or wire
fraud.69
Section 1964(c) does not, however, provide an explicit grant of a private
right to obtain injunctive relief.70 This section affords a general right to
sue, but only section 1964(b) expressly grants the Attorney General equita-
ble relief.71 Arguably, the courts could interpret the treble damage remedy
under section 1964(c) to supplement rather than restrict the equitable rem-
edies already provided in the Act.72 The legislative history of section 1964
suggests, however, that Congress did not contemplate a private right of
64. For a detailed discussion of the procedural considerations of RICO, see CORNELL
INSTITUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON RICO 607-816 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as MATERIALS].
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). Although stringent standing requirements have severely
restricted private plaintiffs from recovery under antitrust laws, Professor Blakey suggests the
policies behind these rules make them inapplicable to RICO. He contends RICO plaintiffs
need more incentive to bring suit. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1040-43.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1976).
67. Id. § 1964(c).
68. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, No. 81-2616 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (injunc-
tive relief granted insurance company in suit against broker); see also Vietnamese Fisher-
men Assoc. v. Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (court assumed availability
of equitable relief but denied injunction on other grounds).
69. See Spencer Cos., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981) (target corporation had standing
to assert RICO claim in takeover attempt); infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
71. Id § 1964(b).
72. The Supreme Court has noted that a congressional grant of a general right to sue,
absent any statutory limitations, confers accessibility to all necessary and applicable reme-
dies: "[I]t is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
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action for equitable redress. 73 RICO was patterned after the antitrust leg-
islation,74 which concurrently enacted two separate provisions for private
rights of action. 75 One provision, in language analogous to section 1964(c),
provides a general right to sue.76 The other provision affords an explicit
grant of injunctive relief.77 Conversely, RICO failed to insert a similar
right-to-equitable-relief provision. In fact, the proposed bills and amend-
ments that espoused a separate provision were rejected 78 as were subse-
quent Senate bills attempting to clarify an individual's rights under
RICO. 79 In light of RICO's legislative history and the absence of an ex-
plicit grant of equitable relief, RICO plaintiffs will have to rely on the
courts' willingness to imply the availability of equitable remedies in pri-
vate actions.80
Apparently, civil RICO actions are permissible as class actions under
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8' If RICO is construed
narrowly, then the Act requires each plaintiff to be injured by at least two
acts of racketeering activity.8 2 Arguably, under a broader interpretation of
the statute, victims of separate racketeering acts could consolidate their
claims against a common defendant and satisfy the RICO pattern of racke-
teering requirement. The plaintiffs would, of course, have to meet the re-
quirements of rule 23 before initiating the group action. The class action
suit would also provide a useful vehicle for encouraging small claim liti-
gants to consolidate their actions when a common enterprise's racketeering
activity has injured several individuals.
While a civil RICO action must be brought in accordance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, section 1965 provides special rules for venue
and service of process.83 Section 1965(a) grants jurisdiction and proper
venue to any district court in which the defendant "resides, is found, has
73. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970), in which the House
Committee on the Judiciary clarified that § 1964(c) solely provided treble damage relief.
74. 113 CONG. REC. 17,999 (1967).
75. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
76. Id § 15.
77. Id. § 26:
78. See, e.g., S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c), 115 CONG. REC. 6996 (1969); H. 19215,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1964(c) (1970).
79. S. 16, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 29,368-69 (1972); S. 13, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 10,319-21 (1973).
80. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), in which the Supreme Court enumerated
the factors necessary to imply a statutory grant of a private remedy. See also MATERIALS,
supra note 64, at 423-27.
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see MATERIALS, supra note 64, at 894-973; see also Van Schaik v.
Church of Scientology, No. 79-2941-G (D. Mass. March 26, 1982), and infra notes 204-08
and accompanying text.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
83. Id § 1965 provides:
(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person
may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in
which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.
(b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of
the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that
other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the
court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose
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an agent, or transacts his affairs."' 84 The venue provisions, however, can be
read in conjunction with the federal venue statute, which lays proper
venue in the district where the cause of action arose.85 Plaintiffs should
also be able to take advantage of the long-arm statute of the state in which
the district court is sitting.86 Section 1965(b), the service of process provi-
sion, is the most liberal and potentially far-reaching of RICO's procedural
devices.8 7 If the venue and jurisdiction requirements of section 1965(a) are
met, the court may, in the interests of justice, serve and join parties nor-
mally not amenable to suit.88 Process may be served in any judicial dis-
trict in the country.8 9 The suit need only be brought in a court that is
proper for at least one defendant.
A private plaintiff pursuing a treble damage recovery under RICO can
take advantage of the broad discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. A major limitation upon discovery, however, may be the
privilege against self-incrimination. 90 Because the same facts that estab-
lish civil liability may also prove criminal liability, RICO defendants will
oftentimes assert the privilege during pre-trial discovery. 91 To avoid de-
lays in discovery due to the asserted privilege or due to the imposition of a
judicial stay, rule 26(c) provides a protective order allowing continued dis-
covery while protecting potentially incriminating information.
92
RICO does not include a specific statute of limitations, and as a result
this issue remains unsettled with respect to private civil actions. The courts
may use this open issue to restrict RICO's application by imposing analo-
gous state limitations periods that are particularly short. Some guidance
may be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal
thereof.
(c) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted by the United
States under this chapter in the district court of the United States for any
judicial district, subpoenas issued by such court to compel the attendance of
witnesses may be served in any other judicial district, except that in any civil
action or proceeding no such subpoena shall be issued for service upon any
individual who resides in another district at a place more than one hundred
miles from the place at which such court is held without approval given by a
judge of such court upon a showing of good cause.
(d) All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter may
be served on any person in any judicial district in which suchperson resides, is
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.
84. Id § 1965(a); see King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 121, 125 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (RICO
claim dismissed because plaintiff failed to satisfy burden of establishing proper venue and
jurisdiction).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976); see Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp.
1278 (D. Del. 1978) (RICO securities fraud claim dismissed because claim against co-con-
spirators arose in district, but defendant had insufficient contacts).
86. State rules regarding amenability to suit are recognized in federal courts. See Black
v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1977).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1976).
88. Id
89. Id
90. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The amendment provides that "no person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id
91. See Comment, Federal Discovery in Concurrent Criminal and Civil Proceedings, 52
TUL. L. REv. 769 (1978).
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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can be found, however, by looking at RICO's model, the antitrust laws.
Before Congress enacted a four-year limitation applicable to antitrust ac-
tions,93 courts typically applied the state statute of limitations for an analo-
gous type of action.94 Some suggestions have recently been made to apply
the nearest analogous federal statute in cases in which the federal law in
question does not provide a limitations period. 95 Apparently, however, fu-
ture treble damage actions under RICO will involve a state statute of limi-
tations, evoking the inevitable questions of which state's statute to apply
and which statute of limitation within that given state controls the action.96
III. RICO's APPLICATION IN COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
Although recent civil RICO decisions have tended to restrict the Act's
availability to individuals in commercial disputes, its application has not
been completely foreclosed. Consequently, a discussion of RICO's poten-
tial use in mail, wire, and securities fraud actions merits some
consideration.
A. Mail and Wire Fraud under RICO97
Section 1961 incorporates mail98 and wire99 fraud into the activities pro-
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-15c (1976).
94. See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
95. See Occidental Life v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977), in which Justice Stewart said
"[s]tate limitations periods will not be borrowed if their application would be inconsistent
with the underlying policies of the federal statute." Id at 367.
96. For example, potentially applicable limitations periods for a RICO suit brought in
Texas would include: (1) two years-personal injury, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526
(Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1982); (2) three years-civil securities actions, id. art. 581-33
(Vernon Supp. 1982); (3) four years-liabilities under penal statutes, id art. 5527 (Vernon
1958 & Supp. 1982); usury, id arts. 5069-1.06, -8.04 (Vernon 1971); and liabilities not
otherwise provided for, id art. 5529 (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1982).
97. For a comprehensive analysis of mail and wire fraud in light of civil RICO actions,
see MATERIALS, supra note 64, at 120-53.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange,
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to
do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes
or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it
is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
99. Id § 1343 provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted
by means of wire, radio, or television communications in interstate or foreign
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scribed by RICO.100 The broad concept of fraud10' reaches many areas of
commercial activity, and RICO provides a plaintiff the potential opportu-
nity to transform a state fraud claim into a federal cause of action. Fear-
ing a deluge of cases on the federal dockets, recent district court decisions
have resisted a broad application of RICO to common law fraud claims. ' 0 2
Apparently, the courts in civil actions will retreat from the broad construc-
tion traditionally given the mail and wire fraud statutes in criminal
prosecutions. 10 3
The mail and wire fraud statutes are in pari materia. 104 Thus, a basic
explanation of section 1341,105 the mail fraud statute, also applies to the
wire fraud statute.' 0 6 The purpose of section 1341 is to prevent the use of
the Postal Service to effect fraudulent schemes. '0 7 An offense under section
1341 consists of two elements: (1) an intent to execute a scheme to de-
fraud; and (2) use of the mails. 08 The concept of a scheme to defraud has
been broadly construed to include "all acts, conduct, omissions, and con-
cealment involving breach of legal or equitable duty and resulting in dam-
age to another."' 0 9 The only state of mind required is an intent to execute
such a scheme."10 Each use of the mails constitutes a separate offense."'
Since each mailing is an offense, and the offense is racketeering activity
under RICO," !2 more than one mailing to perpetrate the scheme estab-
lishes the pattern of racketeering activity necessary to violate RICO." 1
3 If
the defendant or his agent 14 places or takes the mail, or even "causes" the
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
100. Id § 1961(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 39 for text of § 1961(1).
101. See Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687
(1941): "The law does not define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as
versatile as human ingenuity." See also ABA SECTION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSE-
CUTION AND DEFENSE OF RICO AND MAIL FRAUD CASES (1980).
102. See infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 909 and 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d 921, 926 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 309 U.S. 669 (1940).
104. See United States v. Tarnpool, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1341(1976).
106. Id § 1343.
107. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960); United States v. Keane, 522
F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
108. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); Blachley v. United States,
380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967).
109. Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 713 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818
(1962).
110. See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896); United States v. Sparrow,
470 F.2d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1972).
111. See United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 19 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031
(1974); United States v. Crummer, 151 F.2d 958, 962 (10th Cir. 1945).
112. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
113. See United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Hasen-
stab, 575 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Maze, 4144 U.S. 395 (1974).
114. See United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 443 (1917).
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use of the mails, 15 his conduct falls within section 1341.116 The mailing
must be closely related to the scheme, however, and this test has been con-
strued to mean "incident to an essential part of the scheme" and in further-
ance thereof. 17 Routine business mailings that incidentally benefit a
scheme are not offenses."18
A typical mail fraud case under RICO premises the alleged violation
upon section 1962(c), illegal use of an enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity. A pattern of racketeering activity requires two offenses
within a ten-year period, and since each use of the mails constitutes an
offense under the mail fraud statute, the pattern is not difficult to prove.
The plaintiff must then show that the defendant employee or associate
conducted the enterprise's affairs through the pattern of mail fraud.' ' 9 A
common example of a mail fraud allegation involves the use of the mails
to perpetrate a land sale scheme. 120 A company will acquire property and
implement a nationwide marketing scheme to sell the land to the general
public. Deceptive representations may be made to induce potential buy-
ers. If the representations are false and promulgated through the mails by
letters of solicitation, for example, a disenchanted buyer may have a cause
of action under RICO. Provided two or more mailings are made within a
ten-year period, the land sale enterprise engages in interstate commerce,
and the requisite intent to carry out the fraudulent scheme exists, a re-
straining order may be issued to halt the activity, and a treble damage
action may lie.
The initial decisions involving fraud claims under RICO, although only
addressing the dismissal issue, indicated the courts' willingness to apply
the Act to fraudulent transactions. In Hensarling v. Conticommodity Serv-
ices, Inc. ,121 a speculator brought suit against his commodities broker for
losses in trading. The plaintiff founded his RICO claim on alleged mail
and wire fraud. The defendant argued against an overbroad application of
RICO to an "everyday business dispute,"'122 but the court refused to dis-
115. See Pereira v. United States, 447 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954): "[W]here [use of the mails] can
reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then [the defendant] 'causes' the
mails to be used."
116. See supra note 98.
117. 447 U.S. at 8.
118. See United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 668 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909
(1978). Various types of mailings have satisfied the close relationship and in furtherance of
a scheme criteria. See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 483 (7th Cir. 1977) (mail-
ing incidentally informing co-schemers of the plan's status); United States v. Tallant, 547
F.2d 1291, 1298 (5th Cir.) (mailing of securities to the victim following a purchase), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977); United States v. Kelem, 416 F.2d 346, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1969)
(mailing causing delay essential to scheme was in furtherance of scheme), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 952 (1970).
119. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. The enterprise must be engaged in
interstate commerce. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
120. See MATEIALS, supra note 64, at 124-26 (analyzing United States v. AMREP
Corp., 560 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978)).
121. No. 79 C 3112 (N.D. Ill. filed July 27, 1979).
122. Reply Memorandum of Conticommodity Services, Inc., In Support of Its Motion to
Dismiss Counts V and VI, No. 79 C 3112 (N.D. Ill. filed July 27, 1979). Defendant argued
that "Congress did not-could not-have intended to add this enormous club to the arsenal.
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miss the RICO count. 123 A district court in Illinois denied a motion to
dismiss another RICO claim in Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty. 24
The plaintiffs in McCarty were also speculators who suffered losses in
commodities trading. The defendants urged the court to refrain from ap-
plying RICO to "legitimate businessmen," but the court held that commis-
sion of any of the proscribed offenses under the statute was a violation
irrespective of who committed the acts.' 25 In a related case, Parnes v. Hei-
nold Commodities,' 26 another Illinois district court judge refused to dis-
miss a RICO allegation involving the sale of commodities. 27 In Parnes
the court held that a complaint alleging that the defendant used the United
States Postal Service mail system two or more times in furtherance of an
alleged fraudulent scheme in commodities dealings stated a civil cause of
action under RICO.' 28
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,129 another
RICO action that originally survived dismissal, exemplifies the courts ini-
tial receptiveness to bringing "an everyday business dispute" within the
reach of RICO. In Waterman Steamshp the plaintiffs alleged mail and
wire fraud against a contractor and subcontractors based upon misrepre-
sentations about the suitability of defective turbine couplings. 130 In addi-
tion to the typical breach of contract, warranty, negligence, and products
liability claims, the plaintiffs availed themselves of potential treble damage
recovery under a RICO claim predicated on the alleged mail and wire
fraud.' 3 1 The district court in Waterman Steamshp later reversed its ini-
tial denial of summary judgment on the civil RICO claim. 132 The court's
restrictive reading of the statute signified a retreat from the more expansive
construction applied in the earlier action. The court stated that "[t]he civil
remedies provisions of RICO were not designed to convert every fraud or
misrepresentation action involving corporations who use the mails or tele-
phones to conduct their business in interstate commerce into treble dam-
ages RICO actions."' 33 The court noted "a clearly expressed legislative
intent" that RICO was intended to combat activities of organized
criminals and not to apply to private litigants unrelated to organized
crime. 134
The Waterman Steamship decision reiterated the holding of Barr v.
of legal devices already available to private litigants to settle everyday business disputes,
simply because the disputes involve claims of fraud." Id at 3-4.
123. No. 79 C 3112 (N.D. Ill. filed April 8, 1980).
124. 513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
125. Id at 313.
126. 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
127. Id at 647.
128. Id
129. No. 78-2118 (E.D. La. filed Feb. 15, 1980).
130. Id
131. Id
132. 527 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. La. 1981).




WUI/TA S, Inc. ,135 the first case to interpret RICO's private civil remedy
provision. In Barr the plaintiffs attempted to convert an antitrust case into
a RICO violation under the mail fraud statute by alleging that the defend-
ants had used the mails to transmit inflated bills. The district court held
that a RICO claim must allege the defendant's affiliation with organized
crime.' 36 The court feared that to allow a claim to be filed would be "pa-
tently unfair" to the defendant because of the implications of alleging
racketeering activity.137
Subsequent courts, however, uniformly rejected the Barr rationale and
refused to restrict RICO's application solely to proven organized
criminals. 138 Several criminal cases noted that nothing in the language of
the statute required either proof or allegation of any connection to organ-
ized crime. 139 Further, although the express purpose of RICO's enactment
was to eradicate organized crime, two considerations compelled Congress
not to restrict RICO explicitly to organized criminals. First, to confine the
applicability of the statute to one defined group would raise serious doubts
about the constitutionality of the statute.14° Secondly, to require proof of
organized crime affiliation would impose a more difficult burden of proof
and obviate the purpose of the civil provisions' less stringent standards.' 4'
Despite this precedent, a number of recent decisions have returned to
the narrow statutory construction espoused in Barr and Waterman Steam-
ship. 142 In light of the legislative history and the intended effect of RICO's
135. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
136. See supra note 56 for the Barr court's analysis of RICO's legislative history.
137. 66 F.R.D. at 113.
138. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 946 (1980); Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. I11. 1980).
139. See United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1975); United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v.
Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
140. 116 CONG. REC. 35, 343-44 (1970); see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67
(1962), in which the Supreme Court held that a statute punishing a person based upon status
was violative of the 8th and 14th amendments. See also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Inclusion of the term organized
crime in the statute would also raise vagueness questions. See, e.g., Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1976).
141. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
142. In Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1981), purchas-
ers alleging land fraud against developers were denied a cause of action under RICO. After
scrutinizing RICO's legislative history, the court found:
[I]t seems reasonably clear that the limit of the Act's application is to entities
involved with "organized crime" or activities within the penumbra of that
phrase ... There simply is no hint in the congressional proceedings that the
Act was viewed as an alternative, and cumulative, remedy for private plaintiffs
alleging securities fraud or misrepresentations in the context of real estate
transactions. . . They [plaintiffs] . . . have at their disposal laws specifically
designed to remedy fully the injuries they claim to have suffered. There is no
justification for resort to the drastic and unique remedies utilized by Congress
in response to a specific and different problem.
Id at 747-48; see also Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(suit by borrower against lender alleging misrepresentations regarding interest rates dis-
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civil provisions, this judicially imposed restriction may thwart the objec-
tives of RICO. This recent trend suggests an attempt by district courts to
infer a restriction on private actions under section 1964(c) that was not
contemplated by the legislature. As the courts become increasingly wary
of the potential breadth of RICO's application in private suits, they appear
more willing to ignore legislative history and precedent in an attempt to
limit their perceived abuse of the statute's intent.
B. Securities Fraud Under RICO 143
In view of recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the creation of
new implied rights of actions for securities laws violations, 144 RICO pro-
vides an attractive alternative that may yield more severe penalties for the
violator and greater monetary recovery for the victim of securities
fraud. 145 Analogous to the case of mail fraud, a RICO violation arises in
the securities field when two acts of securities fraud, occurring within ten
years and linked by a common scheme, are perpetrated by an enterprise
affecting interstate commerce. 146  Further, because section 1964(c) of
RICO provides an express private right of action for individuals, 147 the
narrow standing requirement for rule lOb-514 8 violations set forth in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores'49 may be inapplicable to RICO ac-
tions. While restricting standing to actual purchasers or sellers of securi-
ties, the Supreme Court's holding acknowledged that a legislative grant of
a private cause of action would obviate Blue Chip's judicial retrench-
missed because such banking practices were "not a recognized form of criminal activity");
Green v. Bartholomew, No. 78 Civ. 3994 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1979) (complaint by plaintiff
against will beneficiary-conservator alleging diversion of funds dismissed because of lack of
racketeering evidence).
143. For a thorough discussion of securities fraud under RICO, see MATERIALS, supra
note 64, at 154-210.
144. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
145. Under the securities laws, a plaintiff in a private action is limited to either recission
or recovery of actual damages. 15 U.S.C. § 77(l) (1976). Under RICO a private plaintiff's
recovery is threefold the damages. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). Attorney's fees are also
awarded under RICO. Id The securities laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(e), 78r(a) (1976), allow a
judge discretion in awarding attorney's fees.
146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
147. Id § 1964(c).
148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
149. 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
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ment.150 Section 1964(c) grants such an express private right of action.' 51
The Court in Blue Chp also expressed concern over the "widespread
recognition that litigation under rule 1Ob-5 presents a danger of vexatious-
ness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation
in general."' 152 These same fears were echoed by some members of Con-
gress during the House deliberations over RICO's enactment. 153 Congress
nonetheless felt compelled to include "any offense involving. . fraud in
the sale of securities"' 154 as a proscribed racketeering activity in order to
reach this common malefaction of organized crime. To safeguard against
vexatious abuse of the statute, Congress required a pattern of activity to be
proven.' 55 Clearly, the scope of the Act did not contemplate an isolated
case of securities fraud. The Act does provide an express right of action,
however, and if the underlying rule lOb-5 violations and the requisite pat-
tern can be established, then RICO may provide victims with a vehicle to
circumvent recent restrictions on the institution of securities fraud claims.
A recent civil RICO action under section 1962(c), alleging securities
fraud, illustrates the statute's potential in this area of commercial litiga-
tion. In Engl v. Berg'5 6 a United States district court refused to dismiss a
claim brought by several limited partners against the promoter of a real
estate syndication. 157 The RICO allegation was premised on two separate
transactions incident to the financing, syndication, and resyndication of a
commercial office building. The first transaction in 1975 involved the pro-
moter's assignment of his interests under a lease to a limited partnership in
which he was the general partner. Those interests were subsequently
purchased by the plaintiffs, based upon a "project synopsis" distributed by
him. 158 The plaintiffs alleged that Berg made false and misleading repre-
sentations to them regarding the nature of the interests in the property in
violation of various securities laws. 159
The second transaction occurred in 1979 when a second limited partner-
ship was formed with the promoter's company as general partner and
twenty-six individuals as limited partners.' 60 Berg and his company, act-
ing as general partner, then conveyed the interests of the first partnership
in an installment sales agreement and a leasehold to the second partner-
ship in consideration of a purchase money mortgage and a "senior partici-
150. The Court stated:
We quite agree that if Congress had legislated the elements of a private cause
of action for damages, the duty of the Judicial Branch would be to administer
the law which Congress enacted; the Judiciary may not circumscribe a right
which Congress has conferred because of any disagreement it might have with
Congress about the wisdom of creating so expansive a liability.
Id at 748.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
152. 421 U.S. at 739.
153. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
155. Id § 1962.
156. 511 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
157. Id at 1156.





pating certificate." 161  Plaintiffs contended that the mortgage was
inadequate and that the transaction occurred without their knowledge or
acquiescence, amounting, therefore, to a forced sale of their interests.
62
Allegedly, the transactions violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933 and rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These trans-
actions, taken together, constituted a pattern of racketeering activity under
RICO.
In establishing the elements of a RICO violation, the court found that
the partnerships were engaged in interstate commerce, and that the 1975
and 1979 transactions involving Berg and his company constituted racke-
teering activity.' 63 The court refuted the defendant's argument that no
proof was shown of a sufficient nexus between the enterprise and its racke-
teering activity.' 64 According to the court, collection and investment of
capital through the syndication and resyndication of the office building
constituted participation "in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs" within
the meaning of section 1962(c).165 As a result, the court refused to dismiss
the RICO allegation as an "overly broad interpretation of RICO."'
66
In Spencer Companies, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car 6 7 a Massachusetts
district court refused to dismiss a RICO action alleging securities fraud in
a corporate takeover attempt.' 68 The plaintiff alleged that the acquiring
corporation acquired stock in two corporations, including the plaintiffs
corporation, through a pattern of racketeering activity. 169 The pattern was
established by the filing of misleading statements pursuant to Regulation
13d. The court rejected the defendant's argument that a literal reading of
the statute's prohibition of "fraud in the sale of securities" excluded
RICO's application to the defendant's acquisition of stock.170 Rather, the
court noted that the remedial nature of the statute encompassed fraud
161. Id
162. The "forced seller" doctrine gives a minority shareholder standing to sue under
securities laws without actual sale of the stock if, because of the corporation's activity, his
only alternatives are to sell at a majority-directed price or retain illusory interests in the
corporation. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967). Plaintiffs claimed that the 1979 transaction transformed tangible interests in a
going partnership into illusory rights to receive mortgage payments in the future. 511 F.
Supp. at 1152.
163. 511 F. Supp. at 1154-55.
164. Id at 1155. Defendants argued that defrauding an enterprise through misuse and
misapplication of its assets was not participation "in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs."
Id; see United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
165. 511 F. Supp. at 1155. The court cited United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), as controlling precedent. 511 F. Supp. at 1156.
166. 511 F. Supp. at 1155-56.
167. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17,
1981), modified, No. 81-2097-S (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 1981).
168. Id at 92,217.
169. Id at 92,216.
170. Id at 92,215. The court cited Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp.,,452 F. Supp.
1278 (D. Del. 1978), in which plaintiffs sued 51 corporate and individual defendants alleging
conspiracy to defraud through the use of a mortgage scheme involving the assignment of
forged securities and concealment of material information. Id at 1279. Predicating the
RICO claim on the securities fraud provision of § 1961(a), the court held that plaintiffs had
a claim for which relief could be granted and refused to dismiss the action. Id at 1280.
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committed by the purchaser as well as the seller of securities. 171
The decisions in Engl and Spencer Companies illustrate how RICO can
be used to complement an action predicated upon violations of the securi-
ties laws. Arguably, a broad reading of the statute's application to securi-
ties fraud will advance RICO's purpose of eradicating organized crime by
providing a more expansive dragnet. It is doubtful, however, that the req-
uisite proof of a pattern of racketeering activity will adequately safeguard
against vexatious litigation. Because a rule 1Ob-5 action will often arise
from the mailing of a prospectus that contains untrue statements or omis-
sions of material fact pursuant to an offer or sale of securities, a pattern of
racketeering activity may easily be established upon use of the mails two
or more times. 172 In this context RICO conceivably applies to any securi-
ties fraud allegation. This broad application of the statute essentially cre-
ates an express private right of action under the securities laws where
previously the courts only recognized a restricted implied right. 173 By pro-
viding a private right of action under RICO, Congress invited an inevita-
ble misuse of the statute and a significant departure from its original
purpose of curbing organized crime's pervasion of legitimate business. If
the legislature chooses not to reconsider the potential breadth of RICO,
the judiciary must assume the legislative task of narrowing the statutory
construction of RICO. One response is the recent restriction imposed by
the courts that requires proof of "competitive injury."
IV. RICO's FUTURE IN COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
The early RICO decisions evinced a receptive attitude toward RICO's
application in commercial litigation and a broad construction of the pri-
vate action under section 1964(c). 174 In light of this acceptance, a recent
influx of RICO claims in business disputes has convinced some courts to
reconsider the Act's intended purpose and to search for rational limitations
upon its extended scope. One previously mentioned judicial curtailment is
the re-emergence of the requirement that a violator be affiliated with or-
ganized crime. 75 Another recently imposed restriction involves standing
to sue under section 1964(c).
Under section 1964(c) a private litigant under RICO must prove injury
to himself or his business "by reason of a violation of section 1962."176
One manifestation of this requirement is the "competitive injury" standard
enunciated in North Barrington Development Co. v. Fanslow. 77 In North
171. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,215.
172. If the mails or a telephone have been used to transmit fraudulent information, the
RICO plaintiff may allege mail or wire fraud and avoid having to prove the underlying rule
lob-5 violations. See supra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
173. See Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (Supreme Court recognized implied private right of action under § 10(b)).
174. See supra notes 121-30, 156-71 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
177. No. 80 C 2644 (N.D. I11. Oct. 9, 1980).
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Barrington the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in a conspir-
acy fraudulently to induce the plaintiffs into signing a contract that con-
veyed to the defendants beneficial title to certain property. 178  In
addressing the section 1964(c) RICO allegation, the court scrutinized the
Act's language and intent and noted that "the purpose of § 1964(c) was not
to transform state law violations into federal violations, but to prevent in-
terference with free competition .. . . In short, plaintiff must allege how
it was injured competitively by the RICO violation in order to state a cause
of action under § 1964(c)." ' 179 The court expressed concern that without
such a requirement RICO would essentially federalize "every bad faith
breach of contract or common law fraud where a plaintiff alleges that de-
fendants used the mails ... ."180 Furthermore, a RICO plaintiff must
plead injury to its business or property through the requisite pattern of
racketeering to establish a RICO violation.181 Injuries arising solely from
the predicate offenses are deemed to be state law offenses. 182
Landmark Savings & Loan v. Rhoades183 articulated another restrictive
standing requirement in RICO actions. In Landmark Savings the plaintiff,
a thrift institution, alleged that the defendants invested income in the ac-
quisition or operation of an interstate enterprise with funds derived from
fraudulent securities sales.' 84 The court noted, however, that "something
more or different than injury from predicate acts is required for a plaintiff
to have standing to recover treble damages under the RICO Statute."' 185
The court cited a Supreme Court decision that articulated the competitive
injury proof required in treble damages actions under federal antitrust
laws but then distinguished the type of injury exacted under RICO.' 86 A
plaintiff must allege a "racketeering enterprise injury" in order to have
standing to sue under RICO. 187 An illustration of this type of injury is the
enhancement of a defendant's ability to harm a plaintiff by the injection of
income from a pattern of racketeering activity into the enterprise. 188 The
court provided no further insight into the meaning of racketeering enter-
prise injuries. The court did, however, assert that the requisite injury
should not "be construed to require a competitive injury as that term is
defined in antitrust suits."1 89
178. Id. at 2.
179. Id at 7-8.
180. Id at 8.
181. Id
182. Id
183. 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
184. Id. at 207.
185. Id at 208.
186. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect
either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation.
Id at 208 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
187. 527 F. Supp. at 208.
188. Id at 209.
189. Id at 208.
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Other courts have refused to impose more restrictive standing require-
ments on section 1964(c) actions. In Hellenic Lines, Lid v. O'Hearn ' 90 the
plaintiff shipping company alleged a RICO violation because of a fraudu-
lent scheme of kickbacks engaged in by the defendant companies and offi-
cials of the International Longshoremen's Association.' 91 After rejecting
the defendant's contention that no injury to the plaintiffs business or prop-
erty had occurred, the court expressly held that no requirement of proof of
competitive injury was intended by Congress.192 The court asserted that
"RICO does not countenance racketeering activity so long as it is done
uniformly among competing concerns."' 193 The court further noted that a
RICO claim was not precluded merely because the predicate crime might
also be actionable under state fraud laws. 194 The same district court in
New York later reaffirmed its interpretation of section 1964(c) in Pruden-
tial Lines, Inc. v. McKeon. 95 In Prudential the plaintiff alleged that its
executive vice-president of operations conspired with the defendant fraud-
ulently to induce the plaintiff to enter into an unfavorable lease agree-
ment.' 96 The parties allegedly agreed that secret kickbacks and bribes
would be paid to the defendant for his efforts to secure the consummation
of the lease. 197 The court dismissed as "specious" the defendant's assertion
that no competitive injury was shown because the plaintiff received a rea-
sonable rate on the lease.' 98 The court noted that the "broad remedial
purposes of RICO clearly permit private law suits by a firm forced to pay
bribes or kickbacks of any kind."' 99
Spencer Companies, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car2° distinguished Hellenic
Lines and afforded standing to a corporation targeted by a defendant cor-
poration in a takeover attempt.20' The court, however, recognized the
"breadth and vagueness" of the statute and the possibility of unwarranted
exposure of a business's previous ten years of activities through extensive
pretrial discovery.202 Consequently, the court insisted that the plaintiff
show "legally compensable injury" before initiating discovery.203 Van
Schaick v. Church of Scientology2°4 subscribed to the Hellenic Lines hold-
ing, but also revealed an awareness of the potential abuse of RICO.20 5 In
Van Schaick the plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of herself and all
190. 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
191. Id at 246.
192. Id at 248.
193. Id
194. Id





200. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17,
1981), modified, No. 81-2097-S (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 1981).
201. Id at 92,217.
202. Id
203. Id
204. No. 79-2491-G (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 1982).
205. Id at 17-18.
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persons who had donated money or property to the Church of Scientology.
The court scrutinized the statutory language "any person injured in his
business or property" and recognized a need to be perceptive to the stat-
ute's "commercial orientation" and "plaintiff class." 206 The court fore-
warned of the potential federalization of consumer protection law if RICO
provided recourse for any consumer who could trace the purchase of a
product to a violation of section 1962.207 The court dismissed the RICO
claim because the plaintiff failed to specify the requisite relationship be-
tween the "person" and the "enterprise" or to allege damages constituting
commercial injury.208
Even in the cases that espouse a broad standing requirement and no
proof of competitive injury, the courts concede an awareness of the poten-
tial expanse of RICO. The express rejection of the competitive injury stan-
dard in Hellenic Lines and Prudential should be qualified. Both cases
alleged fraudulent schemes involving illegal bribes and kickbacks.
Clearly, this kind of activity was contemplated by RICO's legislative his-
tory and statutory language. 209 Accordingly, the courts in Hellenic Lines
and Prudential were less compelled to demand a showing of competitive
injury when the alleged activity was plainly within the intended scope of
the statute. The courts begin to diverge from the statutory purpose of up-
rooting organized crime when they liberally apply the express private right
of action in cases involving state law claims of fraud, tort, and breach of
contract. Even RICO's application to common securities fraud claims sug-
gests a strained interpretation of the Act.
Judicial responses to rising fears of a panacean statute include the com-
petitive injury standard and the revival of the organized crime affiliation
requirement. Whether the latter will succeed in curbing abuse of the stat-
ute is doubtful because of its constitutional deficiencies and its frustration
of the purpose for inclusion of the civil action, the availability and advan-
tages of the civil evidentiary apparatus. 210 In the absence of statutory re-
form, the competitive injury standard is a logical attempt by the judiciary
to restrict RICO's scope. A more restrictive standing requirement that de-
mands a direct causal relationship between the defendant's racketeering
206. Id at 19.
207. Id The court held that:
Such an interpretation would open the federal courts to frequent RICO treble
damage claims by federalizing much consumer protection law and by inviting
plaintiffs to append RICO claims for consumer fraud to nonfederal claims
thereby achieving treble damage recovery and a federal forum. Yet the legis-
lative history contains no hint that Congress intended RICO as a remedy for
private plaintiffs alleging consumer fraud.
Id
208. Id
209. See supra notes 13-32 and accompanying text.
210. Some recent commentators have suggested that the purpose of RICO can be better
effectuated by imposing a clear and convincing evidence requirement rather than the ac-
cepted civil standard of preponderance of the evidence. The imposition of the intermediate
standard would be a restriction that is traditionally a judicial task and would "reduce the
likelihood of erroneous or undesirable outcomes." See Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, CiMi
RICO in the Public Interesi." "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 717 (1982).
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activity and the competitive injury suffered by the plaintiff should aid in
the thwarting of vexatious litigation and the potential federalization of
state law actions. The courts must, however, more clearly define the elu-
sive concept of competitive injury if it is to become a workable standard
for framing RICO allegations in commercial litigation.
Until the legislature reacts to the inevitable abuse invited by its broad
draftsmanship, the courts will be hardpressed to construe the statute in a
fashion that both effectuates the purpose of RICO and safely excludes
those activities not contemplated by the Act. A narrow construction with
strict standing requirements will invariably exclude some members of or-
ganized crime from the statute's reach, while a broad interpretation beck-
ons spurious suits by disgruntled businessmen in search of a federal forum
and treble damages. Rather than relying upon judicially imposed restric-
tions that attempt to construe an already ambiguous legislative history,
Congress should resolve the courts' dilemma by reassessing its initial ef-
forts to remove racketeering from the business community.
V. CONCLUSION
RICO was initially enacted to curb the infiltration of organized crime
into legitimate business. In an effort to realize that intent, Congress pro-
vided civil remedies to facilitate, if not criminal conviction, at least eco-
nomic retribution. Congress also afforded the individual injured by
racketeering activity the opportunity to recover for financial losses. Be-
cause many of the proscribed activities under the antiracketeering statute
were those often arising in commercial litigation, the statute's application
to private party actions was called into question. Although initially recep-
tive to private actions, the courts, fearing a floodgate of potential civil
RICO claims, have begun to restrict the statute's application. Two recent
attempts to narrow the breadth of the Act have been judicially required
proof of an affiliation with organized crime or a showing of competitive
injury from alleged racketeering activity. Both restrictions represent ambi-
tious attempts to construe a convoluted legislative history and an expan-
sive statutory text. As the number of civil RICO actions increases, the
courts must remind themselves that the express intent of RICO is to eradi-
cate organized crime, not to federalize common law claims in commercial
disputes. With the statute's purpose firmly ingrained, the courts will be
better equipped to discourage any perceived abuse of the private action.
Ultimately, however, Congress must assume the burden of redefining the
parameters of the Act and clarifying the existing ambiguities of RICO's
civil provisions.
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